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THE SECOND-BEST FIRST AMENDMENT
FREDERICK SCHAUER*
"If men were angels," James Madison wrote in Federalist 51,
"no government would be necessary."' So too with the first amend-
ment. If those in power were angels, or if their power represented
more of an opportunity than a threat, the first amendment would
also be unnecessary. True, the first amendment's protection of
freedom of speech and press is commonly idealized, whether in
newspaper editorials, in Fourth of July orations, or in law reviews.
Freedom of speech, it is said, is basic, and the freedom to speak
and to write is precisely what separates democracy from totalitari-
anism, liberty from restraint, and freedom from bondage. The first
amendment, it follows, is the bedrock of all that we are and all
that we wish to be.
Yet the claim underlying the slogans glorifying the first amend-
ment is ambiguous, for most common versions of the claim confuse
speaking freely, or even freedom to speak, with a principle or rule
that categorially protects a wide range of communicative acts.
Were we to focus on the rule-like nature of the first amendment,
we would see that the first amendment's foundations lie not with
* Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Michigan. This Article is the ex-
tended version of the Cutler Lecture, given at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of
William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va., on April 13, 1989.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 160 (J. Madison) (Fairfield 2d ed. 1981).
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ideal aspirations, but instead with the kind of arguably necessary
pessimism that Madison's famous line captures. Not only the first
amendment, but also the very idea of a principle of freedom of
speech, is an embodiment of a risk-averse distrust of deci-
sionmakers. Once we understand this, we are able to understand as
well that the first amendment is not the reflection of a society's
highest aspirations, but rather of its fears, being simultaneously
the pessimistic and necessary manifestation of the fact that, in
practice, neither a population nor its authoritative decisionmakers
can even approach their society's most ideal theoretical aspira-
tions. Or so I will attempt to show here.
I
I start with the premise, which I hope by now is commonplace,
that the first amendment's protection of freedom of speech and
press is interesting and important because, and only because, it
immunizes from governmental control certain acts that would not
be so immune were their regulation measured merely against a ra-
tional basis standard. Under the rational basis baseline for assess-
ing the constitutional permissibility of government regulation, in-
cluding prohibitory regulation of individual behavior, virtually any
nonlaughable (and an occasional laughable) justification for gov-
ernmental regulation is constitutionally sufficient.2
Were we to apply this prevailing standard of "nonlaughability"
to recent successful first amendment challenges to government reg-
ulation, we would discover that all of the asserted but ultimately
unavailing justifications for the challenged restrictions on commu-
nicative activity would have satisfied the rational basis baseline.
Whether it be promoting newspapers and some types of
2. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1597 (1989) (equal protection;
limiting admission of teenagers to certain dance halls but not to comparatively similar skat-
ing rinks is rational because "skating involves less physical contact than dancing"); City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (equal protection; allowing otherwise pro-
hibited pushcart vendors to operate in the Vieux Carre if they have operated for the previ-
ous eight years is rational because, inter alia, such long term vendors would likely operate
their businesses in a manner more consistent with the traditions of the area); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (due process and equal protection; prohibiting opti-
cians from placing patients' old lenses in new frames unless they are given a prescription
from an optometrist or ophthalmologist is rational because it furthers the objective of rais-
ing "treatment of the human eye to a strictly professional level").
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magazines,3 maintaining the integrity of political parties,4 prevent-
ing the annoyance of travelers in airports,5 preserving the peace
and quiet of residential neighborhoods,6 maintaining the appear-
ance of dignity in the legal profession,7 protecting women against
the effects of material glorifying sexual violence,8 controlling factu-
ally false public ridicule,9 or protecting Holocaust victims from
emotional distress,1" the courts routinely reject as constitutionally
insufficient under the first amendment various rationales for con-
trolling the behavior of the citizenry that would be constitutionally
sufficient were mere rational basis the standard of measurement.
The first amendment, therefore, does not invalidate irrational re-
strictions of speech; it invalidates numerous restrictions of speech
in spite of their rationality.
Once we understand the way in which the bite of the first
amendment lies in its prohibition of otherwise rational controls, we
are drawn to search for reasons for treating a class of governmental
actions in that way. Although I have views about the validity or
invalidity of various background justifications for the first amend-
ment,11 my agenda here is not to return to that territory. Rather,
for my purposes now, we need only find some background reason
for having the freedom of speech and, consequently, the first
amendment.12
3. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
4. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 109 S. Ct. 1013 (1989).
5. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
6. Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495 (1988).
7. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
8. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
9. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
10. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
11. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Schauer, Must
Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1284 (1983).
12. The existence of a reason for protecting freedom of speech presupposes an instrumen-
tal account of free speech that could be otherwise. Perhaps the value of speech is itself
foundational, as is pleasure for the hedonist utilitarian, or certain other primary goods for
the ideal-consequentialist, or dignity or equal concern and respect for various nonconse-
quentialist theorists. Thus, speaking or communicating, or something of that order, could
possibly be a fundamental, foundational, irreducible good. Under this account, an account
whose implausibility is indicated albeit not proved by the empty set of its proponents, the
very idea of a theory about why we protect speech collapses because maximizing speech for
speech's sake is all the theory we need.
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The protection of freedom of speech can be seen instrumentally
as furthering some background justification, or rationale, or goal.
For example, it might further the goal of facilitating popular deci-
sionmaking, 13 or the goal of providing criticism of or a check on
institutional government, 4 or the goal of fostering the search for
and the identification of truth or error,15 or the goal of inculcating
attitudes of tolerance, 6 or the goal of permitting individual auton-
omy in decisionmaking, 7 or the goal of promoting variously de-
scribed components of personal liberty and self-realization,' or
some number of other less well-established goals.' 9 Whatever the
13. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 16-17
(1948); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 304-22 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971); Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255-57.
14. See H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 69-70 (1988);
Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521,
529-44; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 205.
15. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); J.S. Mill, On Liberty, in
SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 121, 134-71 (M. Cowling ed. 1968); Milton, Are-
opagetica, in COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN MILTON 677, 710-24 (Mod.
Lib. ed. 1950); K. POPPER, 2 THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 42-43 (5th ed. 1966); Duval,
Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Towards a Teleological Approach
to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 188-94 (1972).
16. See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 175-212 (1986).
17. See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 216 (1972);
Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1121-25 (1979).
18. See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 47-48 (1984); Baker,
The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
293, 331-37 (1981); Baker, The Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-1109 (1978); Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory
of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1976); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 591, 622-29 (1982); Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression:
A Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 679-85 (1982); Richards, Free Speech
and Obscenity Law: Towards a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
45, 83-90 (1974). Because all of these arguments see the value of speech in terms of what it
does or what it promotes rather than what it is, they are, for my purposes, consequentialist,
see supra note 12, even though the arguments are components of a larger vision that is not
itself consequentialist.
19. For excellent analytical surveys of background first amendment theories, see Cass,
Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317 (1988);
Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First
THE SECOND-BEST FIRST AMENDMENT
goal may be, however, the point is only that the special protection
for speech fosters something, some justification.
Importantly, all of these background justifications are defined in
terms that do not themselves refer to speech or communication.
Indeed, that is what makes them justifications of freedom of
speech, rather than merely question-begging restatements of the
principle of free speech. One can explain autonomous decisionmak-
ing, or popular sovereignty, or the identification of truth, or limit-
ing the excesses of government officials, or even self-realization
without incorporating speech into the description, and thus all of
these goals, or theories, of what free speech does or promotes are
logically antecedent to a theory of free speech. A theory of free
speech is thus a theory that posits a rationale, or justification, or
goal, in terms other than free speaking, and then maintains that
freedom to speak, or write, or communicate, will promote that pos-
ited rationale, justification, or goal.
II
Freedom of speech is thus ordinarily seen instrumentally, as the
vehicle for promoting some supposed primary, or at least more
fundamental, value. But that leads naturally to the question of
why we have or need free speech, or theories of free speech, at all.
Would it not be possible merely to protect the primary or funda-
mental values against restriction?
Assume that we are dealing with a search for truth justification.
Why could there not be simply a prohibition on governmental con-
trols that interfere with the search for truth? "Congress shall make
no law abridging the search for truth." If some putative restriction
on behavior interfered with the search for truth, that restriction
would be impermissible, and whether the restriction was or was
not a restriction of speech would make no difference.2 0 Many of
these impermissible restrictions would indeed be restrictions on
Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1405 (1987); Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications,
89 COLuM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
20. The analysis here proceeds for the moment at the level of pre-constitutional political
theory. To say that an action is "impermissible" at this level is not to say necessarily that a
court would strike it down pursuant to judicial review under a written constitution. The
action may be subject to criticism alone, but at this level that would still be sufficient to
characterize the action as "impermissible" under the pertinent theory.
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speech, but many would not. For example, were a "search for
truth" justification to be applied directly to various government
restrictions, we might find that many restrictions on experimenta-
tion, travel, and other noncommunicative experiences would be im-
permissible. Conversely, were we again to apply the "search for
truth" justification directly to particular cases, it might be that
various forms of now-protected speech would not be protected. For
example, consider an intentional factual falsehood, but one not di-
rected at individuals and, thus, presumably protected under cur-
rent understandings of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.21 It would
certainly be possible to make an "all things considered" judgment
in a particular case that such an action hindered rather than fos-
tered the search for truth (even given the empirical assumptions of
the "marketplace of ideas" theory),22 and thus would not be pro-
tected by direct application of the "search for truth" justification
to that particular case.
We can identify the same phenomenon with respect to any num-
ber of other free speech justifications. Were we to apply a "popular
sovereignty" justification directly to particular cases, some number
of restrictions on voting, not involving communication, might be
judged impermissible, and some number of currently impermissi-
ble restrictions on communication might no longer be thought
troublesome. For example, restrictions on misleading campaign
promises or claims, now impermissible unless the constraints of
New York Times are satisfied, 3 might be permitted, as would re-
strictions on now-unrestrictable market-distorting spending or
other power disparities.24
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Interestingly, no Supreme Court case appears to establish the
well-accepted proposition that intentional factual falsehoods, in domains otherwise within
the coverage of the first amendment, are protected. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60-63
(1982), lends some support to the proposition in the text, as does Pestrak v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 670 F. Supp. 1368, 1374-78 (S.D. Ohio 1987), clarified, 677 F. Supp. 534 (S.D. Ohio
1988). The contrary view, however, gets some support from In re Grand Jury Matter, Gro-
nowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 986-89 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986).
22. See generally Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE
L.J. 1.
23. Brown, 456 U.S. at 60-61.
24. See Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,
251-52 (1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480, 497-98 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1976); see also Miami
[Vol. 31:1
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Similarly, if we were to apply a "self-realization" justification di-
rectly to particular cases, some currently unprotected noncom-
municative acts of self-realization might be protected, 5 while some
communicative (speech) but nonself-realizing acts might not.
Again, no point is served by quibbling about individual cases. The
claim is only that were we to think in terms of justifications for
free speech as applied to particular cases, as opposed to "freedom
of speech" being applied to particular cases, the results would be
at least slightly different. From this perspective, "freedom of
speech" is necessarily both underinclusive and overinclusive with
respect to its background justification, whatever that background
justification might be.
III
The activity of speaking is thus underinclusive and overinclusive
with respect to any background justification for protecting it. One
should note that this is not a function of the crudeness of "speech"
as compared to more justification-tailored subsets of speech.26 For
example, even if we were considering "political speech" under a
democratic theory rationale, or "ideological" or "scientific" speech
under a rationale making that kind of speech worthy of special
protection, there would still be cases in which a particular instance
of that kind of speech would not serve its background justification,
and others in which an instance of something outside of the defini-
tion of the "kind" would serve that justification. Only by defining
the kind in terms of its background justification will this possibil-
ity be avoided; but by doing so, we have just decided to apply that
background justification directly to particular cases. If, however,
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974) (statute requiring Florida
newspapers to print replies is a cost to newspapers that violates the first amendment).
25. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964,
990-1009 (1978), urges this result. Different conceptions of substantive due process would of
course come to the same conclusion, but what makes Baker's position distinctive is his use
of the first amendment to reach that result.
26. For a discussion of how any conception of the speech protected by the freedom of
speech is but a subset of speech simpliciter, see Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Free-
dom of Speech, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1081 (1983); Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 645; Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts,
34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981); Schauer, Speech and "Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity".
An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
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we do not do this, and define the coverage of freedom of speech in
terms that are not coincident with the terms used to define free
speech's background justification, then the existence of an area of
underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness for free speech vis-a-vis
its background justification is inevitable.2"
Note that even my use of "background justification" is a simpli-
fying but unnecessary assumption. The justification for freedom of
speech is ordinarily part of a larger array of justifications, or is
merely the instrumental manifestation of an even deeper justifica-
tion, such as the promotion of human dignity, the maximization of
happiness, the promotion of public welfare, or whatever. In that
respect even a justification for freedom of speech may itself be un-
derinclusive or overinclusive with respect to its background justifi-
cation, or with respect to the array of justifications of which this is
but one component. Suppose, for example, that free speech is per-
ceived as a way of promoting popular decisionmaking, but that
popular decisionmaking, at the next remove, is perceived as a way
of embodying equality among all persons. We may then discover
that some forms of popular decisionmaking do not promote equal-
ity, and that equality is promoted by forms of decisionmaking that
are not popular. With respect to such cases, popular decisionmak-
ing appears to be both underinclusive and overinclusive with re-
spect to its background justification.
If we were to assemble all of the justifications that go as deeply
as it is possible to go within a given perspective on justification, we
could then say that, with respect to every event or every set of
facts, there is some best "all things considered" result that is the
product of applying those deepest justifications (or that one deep-
est justification) directly to that event. Whether we get there di-
rectly or indirectly through several levels of intermediate justifica-
27. I deal with justifications singularly only for ease of exposition. The same point would
hold, obviously, were the justification for free speech some combination of these various
justifications. In order to avoid complications unnecessary to my argument, I also simplify
the justifications themselves. Thus, for example, the justification for protecting speech may
be that speech is thought to promote self-realization and that speech is less harmful than
other forms of conduct, a position espoused by Professor Redish, supra note 18. But even
with this more complex justification, my point about underinclusiveness and overinclusive-
ness still holds, for the resultant free speech rule protects some conduct, such as harmful
self-realizing speech, that direct application of the background justification would not.
[Vol. 31:1
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tion, we will discover that freedom of speech is underinclusive and
overinclusive with respect to direct application of the "all things
considered" array of justifications to particular cases.
IV
Why, then, at the level of political theory, do we not just forget
about "freedom of speech" and apply its background justifications
directly to particular cases? And why, at the level of constitution-
making, does the Constitution refer to "the freedom of speech"
rather than to those background principles that for its drafters ex-
plained the importance of protecting freedom of speech in the first
place? Why do we accept the necessary imperfection that comes
from the underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness that is built
into defining the right to free speech (or any other right) in a
description that is extensionally divergent from the description of
its background justification?
This question appears to have a two-part answer. First, we com-
monly believe that in most cases the coverage (or extension) of the
right as defined will track rather than diverge from the coverage of
its background justification. When we instantiate a justification,
whether with a rule or with a right,"8 we believe that the instantia-
tion will indicate, at least probabilistically, the results that direct
application of the background justification would generate. The re-
lationship is one of tendency rather than inexorability or inevita-
bility. Thus, when we instruct police officers always to give a Mi-
randa warning before interrogating a suspect, we do not believe
that giving such a warning will serve the purposes behind Miranda
v. Arizona29 in every case. Rather, we think that giving the warn-
ing will serve those purposes in most cases. Behind any nonfrivo-
lously constructed rule (or right) is a statistical presupposi-
tion-that the presence of the triggering facts identified in the rule
indicates, at the very least, the applicability of the rule's justifica-
28. I take a right, in its structural operation, to be importantly similar to or a species of
rule. See Schauer, Rights as Rules, 6 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 115, 116-19 (1987). This view
does not apply to those rights that under a rights-based moral or political theory are ulti-
mate, or foundational. It does apply, however, to any right that in some moral or political
theory is seen to serve or to instantiate some even deeper principle.
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tion to a greater extent than would be indicated by purely random
application. Thus, the existence of a triggering set of facts-
interrogation of a suspect by a police officer-indicates a greater
likelihood of the applicability of the justifications behind Miranda
than would be indicated by random identification of police
behavior.
Normally, of course, the correlation between rule and justifica-
tion, the degree of indication provided by the rule, will be substan-
tially higher than this minimal statistical threshold, even as it falls
short of the perfect indication provided when all cases of the appli-
cability of the rule are cases of the applicability of its background
justification. Ordinarily, rules are designed in such a way that the
applicability of the rule at least usually indicates the applicability
of its justification.30
This probabilistic analysis of the relationship between a rule and
its justification applies to the relationship between freedom of
speech and its justifications. Immunizing political speech from reg-
ulation under a popular sovereignty justification, for example, is
premised on the belief that immunizing political speech from gov-
ernmental regulation will usually serve the goals of promoting pop-
ular sovereignty. Similarly, we might believe that protecting indi-
vidual statements of opinion from restriction will usually promote
self-realization, or that disabling government from restricting
speech on account of its supposed falsity will usually advance the
search for truth, and so on. The instantiation of the background
justification in terms of a right to "speech"'" is premised on the
presupposition that "speaking" will ordinarily, or usually, or al-
most always, serve the goals embodied in the background justifica-
tion itself.
The presence of this probabilistic relationship, of at least a ten-
dency,3 2 is not sufficient, of course, to establish the existence of a
30. Obviously, a close parallel exists between what I say here and a common form of
thinking about "fit" for equal protection purposes. The classic is Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949). An important recent analysis is
Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REv. 447 (1989).
31. On the reason for the scare quotes, see supra text accompanying note 26 and infra
text accompanying notes 36-44.
32. On the use of the word "tendency" to mark this relationship, see A. QUINTON,
UTILITARIAN ETHIcs 47-48 (1973); Urmson, The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of
J.S. Mill, 3 PHIL. Q. 3, 37 (1953).
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rule because we could be dealing not with a "real" rule at all, but
only with a rule of thumb, one that provides no decisionmaking
guidance qua rule, and which therefore furnishes no reason for fol-
lowing it in cases in which its background justification is inapplica-
ble. 3 Where rules are but rules of thumb, the decisionmaker does
not follow the rule in its area of underinclusiveness or overinclu-
siveness. If the decisionmaker has reason to believe that the result
indicated by the rule of thumb is not that which would be indi-
cated by direct application of the rule of thumb's background jus-
tification, she is free to ignore the prescriptions of the rule of
thumb. Consequently, rules of thumb, however heuristically useful
they may be, are decisionally superfluous, for the results under a
rule of thumb decision procedure are those that would be gener-
ated by direct application of the rule's background justification.
More substantial rules exist, therefore, when, and only when, the
probabilistic relationship I have just described is converted into a
universal one. That is, rules operate as rules, in the sense I am now
describing, 34 only when the fact that an event falls within the cov-
erage of the rule provides a reason for deciding in that way, even
when the event would not fall within the rule's justification. 5
Thus, the important features of rules are: (1) the existence of a
probabilistic relationship between the rule and its background jus-
tification; and (2) a decisionmaking procedure pursuant to which
the inclusion of an event within the rule is itself a reason for treat-
33. See R. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEvELS, METHOD AND POINT 37-38 (1981); Smart,
Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, 6 PHIL. Q. 344, 344 (1956); Urmson, supra note 32,
at 36.
34. I do not claim that there is anything "false" about using the word "rule" to refer to a
rule of thumb. Still, given that "rule" can be used to refer both to a form of decisionmaking
(rule of thumb) in which the rule is completely transparent to its justification, and to a form
of decisionmaking in which rules are at least partially opaque to those justifications, I be-
lieve that the latter has a somewhat closer affinity to the ordinary use of "rule." Nothing in
my argument, however, turns on this question of meaning. My only point is to separate two
importantly distinct forms of decisionmaking.
35. For a discussion of the linguistic assumptions that undergird the claim that a rule can
have an extension different from its lackground justification, see Schauer, Formalism, 97
YALE L.J. 509, 532-35 (1988). Note also that the reason provided by the rule qua rule need
not be absolute, nor conclusive. As long as the rule qua rule provides some reason, even only
a presumptive one, it still functions as something more than a mere rule of thumb. See
Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REv. 847 (1987). Thus,
to say that a rule is of universal application is not to say that its mandates are conclusive. It
is to say only that the rule provides a reason for decision in every case within its extension.
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ing the event in the way indicated by the rule, even in those cases
in which the event falls outside of the applicability of the rule's
background justification. And as should be apparent, all of this is
directly relevant to thinking about the relationship between free-
dom of speech (the rule) and any one or more of its background
justifications.
V
Once we understand how rules operate in relation to their back-
ground justifications, we can see that free speech decisionmaking
operates in just this way, and that "free speech" is the rule instan-
tiating its background justification. On numerous occasions, the
presence of an event within the coverage of some notion of
"speech" is sufficient to trigger application of the "more than ra-
tional basis" protection of the first amendment, even though the
event does not fall within the coverage of its justification, or would
not be decided in the same way were we to apply the best "all
things considered" judgment of the society's prevailing political
theory. In this regard consider not only the cases that invalidate
democracy-promoting restrictions on political speech,36 but also
those that protect racial epithets and other racist speech,37
subordinate women,38 ' intend to cause injury to others,39 involve
false speech, 0 and so on. Again, I am sure that readers will quarrel
with this or that example, but my point is only that these are ex-
amples, to me, of cases in which direct application of the reasons
behind the protection of freedom of speech could well have yielded
the opposite result. Others may find different examples of the
same phenomenon, but only the phenomenon and not the exam-
ples is important here. From the perspective informed by identifi-
cation of this phenomenon, these appear to be cases in which free-
36. See supra notes 23-24.
37. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
38. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), af'd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
39. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
40. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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dom of speech is operating in rule-like fashion. If something is
speech in the relevant sense, and that relevant sense is some num-
ber of further rules still not coextensive with free speech's back-
ground justification, then there is at least presumptive protection,
even if the background justification would not be served, and even
if an "all things considered" judgment about this particular case
might have come out the other way.
Let me reemphasize that my point is not that free speech rules,
such as the ones that generated each of the foregoing results, rules
like those set forth in Brandenberg v. Ohio,4 New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,42 Miller v. California,43 and Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission,44 are crude imple-
ments. Rather, my point is that the very idea of free speech is a
crude implement, to the core, protecting acts that its background
justifications would not protect, and failing to protect acts that its
background justifications would protect. Were we to eliminate this
crudeness, and tailor free speech decisionmaking precisely to its
background justifications, we would discover that free speech had
become superfluous, because we would be applying the nonspeech-
defined background justifications directly to particular cases. Were
this the case, quite a bit of speech would still be protected, and
quite a bit of freedom to speak would still exist. But this protec-
tion of speech would be merely incidental to protecting democratic
decisionmaking, or activities searching for truth, or self-realizing
behavior, or conduct checking the abuses of governmental officials,
and so on. The fact of an event being an instance of speech would
mean nothing if that event were not also an instance of the back-
ground justification, and the fact of an event not being an instance
of speech would also mean nothing if that event were an instance
of the background justification. Consequently, all of the normative
work would be done by the background justification, and the fact
of an event being an instance of speech would be decisionally
irrelevant.
41. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
42. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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We can now see why there is nothing ideal about the protection
of freedom of speech as we know it. Were we searching for the
ideal, we would apply background justifications directly, or make
particularistic "all things considered" judgments about individual
cases, applying the best political theory directly to particular cases
as best we could.4 5 Even if "speech" is qualified by numerous rules
giving it a highly technical meaning, the very fact that the general-
ization "speech" makes a difference indicates a decision to avoid
the ideal, to protect speech in some number of cases in which ide-
ally it ought not to be protected. It is not that the free speech rules
we have are less than ideal. It is that free speech itself is a willing-
ness to settle for less than the ideal.
VI
Having seen that the very idea of free speech is a nonideal ap-
proach to serving free speech's background justifications, and hav-
ing discovered that this is a function of the way in which the dis-
tinct principle of freedom of speech is a species of rule, we can now
understand that explaining why we have a principle of free speech
involves looking to why we have rules at all. There are, of course,
numerous reasons for having rules, but many of them are not rele-
vant in this context. Traditional justifications for rules in terms of
predictability, reliance, and certainty do not seem particularly ger-
mane. But rules serve other purposes as well, and one of those, the
disabling of certain classes of decisionmakers from making certain
kinds of decisions, does appear especially pertinent to thinking
about freedom of speech as a rule.46
At this point we must be more precise about the decisionmakers
to whom we are referring. First, therefore, let us think about free-
dom of speech in terms of a mandate to primary (nonjudicial) gov-
45. On particularistic legal decisionmaking, see generally Farber, Legal Pragmatism and
the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the
First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Minow, The Su-
preme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987).
46. Although in the context of free speech I focus on decisionmaker distrust and deci-
sionmaker disability, the larger theme is that rules are devices for the allocation of power,
with the disabling of certain decisionmakers because we distrust their decisionmaking abili-
ties being merely a subset of that larger function.
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ernmental officials. From this perspective, we can see the first
amendment as a rule directed to those officials, saying, in essence,
"Make no law (or take no action) abridging the freedom of
speech." As we have seen, "abridging the freedom of speech," "the
freedom of speech," "freedom of speech," and "speech" are all the-
ory-soaked and doctrinally-encumbered terms of art.47 But that is
not relevant to the matter at issue, as long as we acknowledge that
the sum total of all of the theory-ladenness and all of the doctrine
is still to leave some space between the sum total and what the
justification or justifications for freedom of speech would do if ap-
plied directly. That is, all of first amendment doctrine taken to-
gether remains extensionally divergent from the unmediated appli-
cation of "promote the search for truth," or "foster self-
realization," or "establish popular sovereignty," or whatever. Con-
sequently, my references to instructing officials to "make no law
abridging freedom of speech" can be taken as a stylistically con-
venient metaphor for this extensionally divergent array of first
amendment doctrines.
If, therefore, we were establishing instructions for governmental
officials, why would we not simply instruct them in accordance
with the background justifications, not telling them to "make no
law abridging the freedom of speech," but instead telling them to
"make no law interfering with the search for truth," and so on?
When put this way, the question seems almost to answer itself. For
if we think of the full range of governmental officials, including
members of a town council deciding whether certain bookstores
should be restricted, police officers deciding whether to arrest
someone whose criticism of government policy includes strong lan-
guage, a city clerk deciding whether to issue a parade or rally per-
mit to members of a local communist organization, and members
of the Chicago Police Department deciding whether to remove an
offensive painting of a popular former mayor from the walls of the
School of the Art Institute, we wonder about entrusting to this ar-
ray of officials the responsibility for making particularistic, case-
47. In addition to authorities cited supra note 26, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 18-19 (1948); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.01 (1984); Van Alstyne, A
Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 148-50 (1982).
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sensitive determinations regarding what forms of activity will pro-
mote the search for truth and what forms will not, what conduct is
consistent with democratic theory and what is not, and which acts
are self-realizing and which acts are not.
Wary, therefore, of the mistakes that might be made in direct
application of these background justifications, the "make no law
abridging the freedom of speech" instruction substitutes the built-
in errors of underinclusion and overinclusion for the errors thought
to be empirically, although not logically, attendant to a more maxi-
mally precise particularistic evaluation. This strategy recognizes
that the simplified "free speech" instruction is nonideal, prohibit-
ing the official from taking certain actions that would not jeopard-
ize the background justification and allowing some number of ac-
tions that would. Still, the choice in the instruction for the
instantiation rather than the justification is based on the empirical
supposition that these errors are likely to be less in frequency and
smaller in magnitude than the errors that might be expected were
the background justification alone used as the instruction to these
primary officials.4"
It is important to appreciate the empirical underpinnings of a
decision to instruct an official in terms of a rule, such as freedom
of speech, rather than in terms of its background justification, such
as promoting the search for truth. If we were confident of that offi-
cial's ability to determine which conduct would promote the search
for truth and which would not, we would be reluctant to instruct
that official in terms of a cruder rule, one with errors built into
even its faithful application. To choose the rule, the instantiation
of the background justification, is therefore to make an assessment
that the relevant addressee of the rule, here an official or class of
officials, is not to be trusted to make that case-sensitive evaluation.
48. It seems, then, that with regard to any rule which is generally useful, we may
assert that it ought always to be observed, not on the ground that in every
particular case it will be useful, but on the ground that in any particular case
the probability of its being so is greater than that of our being likely to decide
rightly that we have before us an instance of its disutility. In short, though we
may be sure that there are cases where the rule should be broken, we can never
know which those cases are, and ought, therefore, never to break it.
G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 162-63 (1903); see Urmson, Moore's Utilitarianism, in G.E.
MOORE: EssAYs IN RETROSPECT 343, 343-49 (A. Ambrose & M. Lazerowitz eds. 1970).
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The empirical assumption is that those who crafted the rule will
get it closer to right than will the official trying to apply the back-
ground justification directly without the benefit of the rule.4 9 In so
proceeding, however, we accept the benefits of comparative close-
ness of getting it right in exchange for the aspirations of getting it
right all the time (from the perspective of a given background jus-
tification or set of justifications), for that aspiration can be served
only by avoiding the rule and applying the background justifica-
tion directly to the diversity of experience.
VII
Let me focus now on the first amendment not as a mandate to
primary officials, but as a mandate to judges who determine the
constitutionality of the primary officials' conduct. Again, we must
distinguish prescriptions to judges that would have them apply the
justifications for freedom of speech directly to particular cases
from prescriptions that would have them apply the necessarily un-
derinclusive and overinclusive notion of freedom of speech itself to
those cases.
We could think about this choice purely as a question of consti-
tutional interpretive theory. The first amendment, after all, refers
not to searching for truth, or to self-realization, or to popular sov-
ereignty, but to "the freedom of speech." Whatever indeterminacy
that phrase contains, and however much it needs to be filled out by
theory-informed subrules and doctrines, that language itself would
stand as a barrier to viewing the notion of "the freedom of speech"
as totally transparent to its background justifications were we to
view the text of the Constitution as itself a rule. Under such an
approach, one for which I have some sympathy, 50 the phrase "the
freedom of speech" would provide some decisional input, some rea-
son for protection, even in those cases in which the phrase's back-
49. This may explain why it is perhaps appropriate to view the first amendment not as
theoretically coherent, but rather in terms of a specific response to specific kinds of proclivi-
ties towards error during specific historical periods. See Alexander & Horton, The Impossi-
bility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1319 (1983).
50. See Schauer, Rules, the Rule of Law, and the Constitution, 6 CONST. Com. 69
(1989); Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 41 (1987);
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985); Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional
Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797 (1982).
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ground justifications were not served, and the phrase would also
provide some decisional barrier to applying the background justifi-
cation to cases not encompassed by the phrase.5 1 Exactly how this
works, and exactly how the competing concerns of fidelity to text
and the recognition of the technical nature of the terms involved
are to be accommodated, is not something I can take up here. The
point is only that if we were to adopt a rule-based view of constitu-
tional language, then a view about the status of "the freedom of
speech" as a rule would flow from that, at least somewhat indepen-
dent of views about the substance of free speech decisionmaking in
particular.
Nothing in the Constitution, however, dictates that its language
be interpreted in such rule-like fashion. Nor does anything in the
Constitution prohibit such an approach. The "ruleness" of pre-
scriptive language is not determined by the language itself.52 It is
determined instead by the norms of internalization of those to
whom the language is directed. In other words, were the norms of
judicial interpretive behavior such that the prescriptions in the
Constitution were to be treated only as transparent rules of thumb,
the Constitution itself would not be "violated." The question of
how to interpret the Constitution, therefore, is a question of politi-
cal and legal theory, a question that might be answered in favor of
a rule-based approach to constitutional language, but might also be
answered in favor of a rule of thumb approach.
Under the latter approach, one that allows constitutional inter-
preters such as judges to view the constitutional text as transpar-
ent, and allows constitutional interpreters to identify background
justifications and apply them directly to particular cases, we can-
not avoid thinking directly about the substance of free speech, and
about the same kinds of questions of decisionmaker competence
that I- discussed in terms of nonjudicial officials. Now the question
is whether judges should be empowered to determine whether a
51. Without delving into the question, let me note the possibility of an asymmetry here.
Perhaps extending the protections of the Constitution to events not within its textual con-
tours is somehow less unfaithful to one conception of constitutionalism than is failing to
extend the protections of the Constitution to events that are within its textual contours. But
perhaps not.
52. See Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 186-90 (1986).
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challenged governmental action did or did not conflict with the
justifications lying behind "the freedom of speech." If there were
such a conflict, the challenged action would be invalidated as un-
constitutional, even if that action, though an instance of the back-
ground justification, was not an instance of "the freedom of
speech." Conversely, if the action and the background justification
did not conflict, the action would be upheld, even if it were an
instance of "the freedom of speech."
As with other governmental officials, resolving this issue requires
making assessments about the competence of those who would pu-
tatively be applying the background justifications directly to par-
ticular cases. If we believe that they would do so with sensitivity
and wisdom, and get it right a high percentage of the time, then
the rule-based approach ought to be rejected and judges told to
determine in individual cases whether the values informing the
principle of free speech were promoted by striking down a particu-
lar government action. Judges would then be in the business of ap-
plying not the principle of freedom of speech, but the background
principles, whatever they were determined to be. Conversely, if we
believe that judges would, for various reasons, err with some fre-
quency in applying the background justifications directly to partic-
ular cases, then we might prefer the rule-based approach, one
whose underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness prevents judges
from reaching the optimal result in every case, but whose probabil-
istic simplification may also be optimal over the aggregate of cases
by preventing the even larger number of errors that might be the
product of a particularistic approach.
Nothing says that these determinations must be constant across
the judiciary. One plausible approach might be to say that the Su-
preme Court should be particularistic, applying the deepest level
of background theory directly to the facts of particular cases, 3 but
53. My references to case-direct application of background justifications need to be quali-
fied in an important way. I have been working with a distinction that contrasts the result
indicated by a rule with the result indicated by direct application of the justification lying
behind it. But that distinction turns on a seemingly questionable assumption about the
kinds of justifications that undergird a rule. More specifically, I have thus far failed to dis-
tinguish two types of justification. One, which I will call a substantive justification, estab-
lishes the background rationales behind the rule. This is the type of justification I have been
considering, and thus justifications such as promoting the search for truth, fostering self-
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that other judges should have a much more rule-based approach to
realization, and establishing popular sovereignty are all substantive justifications. By con-
trast, another type of justification, one I will call a rule-generating justification, provides
the rationale for specifying the substantive justification in the form of a rule. Rules do not
emerge from nowhere. Rather, they are created as an alternative to a direct and uninstan-
tiated statement of the rule's substantive justification in prescriptive form, leaving the justi-
fication to do its own normative work. But when this alternative is not selected, and the
substantive justification is instead instantiated in the form of a rule, that decision to instan-
tiate or specify the substantive justification must itself be justified, and this latter justifica-
tion, the justification for having a rule, is what I call the rule-generating justification.
If we acknowledge the existence of rule-generating justifications as part of the array of
justifications lying behind a rule, a judge or other decisionmaker consulting this expanded
array of justifications would then be entitled in some cases to conclude that obedience to the
rule itself was required even though the rule indicated a different result from that indicated
by the rule's substantive justifications taken alone. This possibility, that in some cases a
particularistic decisionmaker might still conclude that the rule should be followed despite
divergence between rule and substantive justification, threatens my claims about exten-
sional divergence, because it now appears that the outcome produced by direct application
of all of a rule's justifications will match the outcome produced by the rule in every case
except those in which the reason for having a rule at all is insufficient to overwhelm the
force of the rule's substantive justifications. This decision procedure appears to be one in
which the formal values of "ruleness" are recognized, but which also takes into account all
relevant features in every particular case. This procedure, which we can designate as rule-
sensitive particularism, is one in which the rules are rules of thumb in the sense of being
transparent to their substantive justifications, but in which their very existence and effect as
rules of thumb became a factor to be considered in determining whether the rules should be
set aside when the results they indicated diverged from the results indicated by direct appli-
cation of their substantive justifications. For suggestions about this type of decision proce-
dure, see G. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 410-11, 446-48 (1986).
Similar themes can be found in M. DETMOLD, THE UNITY OF LAW AND MORALITY (1984);
Gans, Mandatory Rules and Exclusionary Reasons, 15 PHILOSOPHIA 373 (1986).
The desirability, and even the plausibility, of rule-sensitive particularism, however, seems
to be a function of thinking about the advantages of rules from the perspective of reliance,
certainty, and predictability. If these were the only values that rules were designed to serve,
if these were the normally applicable rule-generating justifications, much could be said for
rule-sensitive particularism, because judges and other decisionmakers could determine in
each case whether avoiding the harsh strictures of the rule in this case would excessively
defeat those values that justified having the rule in the first instance. But the conclusion
may be different if we see rules as serving not so much as implements for achieving predict-
ability, but as devices for the allocation of power. If the virtues of "ruleness" are seen to
reside primarily in decisionmaker disability, then the difference between rule-sensitive par-
ticularism and the stronger form of rule-based decisionmaking I have been using up to this
point becomes enormously important. If we are guided by a concern that certain deci-
sionmakers should not be making certain kinds of decisions, such as the decision that this
instance of speech is not one that serves the purposes for having freedom of speech, then
authorizing a decisionmaker to determine whether this is the kind of decision with respect
to which she should not be trusted appears, although not logically inconceivable, neverthe-
less psychologically bizarre. Similarly, authorizing a decisionmaker to determine whether in
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free speech questions. 4 I do not want to take a position on this
here. One should note, however, that because the questions about
the virtues of "ruleness" are essentially empirical ones about par-
ticular institutions and particular arrays of decisionmakers, there
is every reason to suppose that relevant variations in competence
and in role occur even among those who wear robes and call them-
selves judges.
Thus, the central question about freedom of speech is as applica-
ble to judicial as to nonjudicial free speech decisionmaking. For
example, when we think about the free speech particularism of
Justice Stevens,55 we are drawn (or ought to be drawn) to think
about whether that particularism provides sufficient guidance for
nonjudicial officials and for lower court judges, decisionmakers we
may not trust to apply background justifications directly to partic-
ular cases. At the level of the Supreme Court, however, the ques-
tions are slightly different. We must ask whether we want the
Court itself to operate in an optimizing mode, recognizing that
while that mode may reflect our highest aspirations, it may, at the
same time, entail the greatest risks. Or, do we want the Court, like
other officials, to be less concerned with optimizing in the individ-
ual case and more concerned with the case-specific suboptimality
that may, in some contexts, be the optimal decision procedure in
the long run. Finally, we must consider whether the very idea of
this case the virtues of not trusting her will be outweighed by other considerations seems
inconsistent with this type of rule-generating justification. If we do not trust a deci-
sionmaker to determine x, then we can hardly trust that decisionmaker to determine that
this is a case in which the reasons for disabling that decisionmaker from determining x
either do not apply or are outweighed.
54. This view may be especially appealing once we think about doctrinal rules made (and
changeable) by the Supreme Court. Although I have been talking about free speech as itself
a rule, the rules about free speech are also rules, and most of what I have said applies
mutatis mutandis to these rules when they are applied by courts other than the Supreme
Court.
55. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2508 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pa-
cific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 35 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 691 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 777 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Schad v. Borough of Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 79 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
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free speech dictates the latter and not the former, because with
maximal particularism the constraints of categories, including the
category of speech, fall by the wayside.
VIII
We can see that thinking about the advantages of case-specific
suboptimality, of necessarily crude and underinclusive and overin-
clusive rules, and of second-best solutions, is pertinent throughout
the range of free speech issues. Case-specific suboptimality is rele-
vant in determining what kinds of free speech rules are most ap-
propriate as guidance for frontline governmental officials who, far
more than judges, determine how much the first amendment
means in this country. Case-specific suboptimality is relevant also
in determining what kinds of free speech rules the courts them-
selves should be bound by, for judges and not only other officials
are frequently the objects of our distrust. 6 Most importantly,
though, case-specific suboptimality is relevant in thinking about
the very idea of free speech itself, for the idea of free speech, as
contrasted with the justifications it is thought to serve, is itself an
exercise in distrust, in suboptimality, and in the recognition of the
frequent virtues of second-best solutions.
My analysis remains incomplete in an important way. As I have
suggested, the essence of the idea of free speech lies in the idea of
a rule, but the "ruleness" of a rule, as I have argued elsewhere,57 is
closely tied to a formalistic understanding of a rule's prescriptions.
When a rule is formulated in language capable of comparatively
noncontroversial application according to existing linguistic under-
standings, this is relatively nonproblematic. But when, as with the
first amendment, and as with the idea of free speech itself, the rule
exists in open ended and theory-laden language, the likelihood of a
rule simply collapsing into its justification is great. If a rule-based
understanding of the idea of free speech captures our intuitions
about what free speech and the first amendment are all about, we
must think about how, if at all, rule formulations can be simulta-
56. For a particularly relevant discussion of thinking about first amendment rules and
first amendment discourse in terms of preventing the worst case, see Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1985).
57. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 532-35 (1988).
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neously theory-laden and constraining, informed by background
justifications but extensionally divergent from those justifications.
That task, however, must wait for another day.
